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Abstract
In comparison to qubit-based protocols, qudit-based quantumkey distribution ones generally allow
two cooperative parties to share unconditionally secure keys under a higher channel noise. However, it
is very hard to prepare andmeasure the required quantum states in qudit-based protocols in general.
One exception is the recently proposed highly error tolerant qudit-based protocol known as the
Chau15 (Chau 2015Phys. Rev.A 92 062324). Remarkably, the state preparation andmeasurement in
this protocol can be done relatively easily since the required states are phase encoded almost like the
diagonal basis states of a qubit. Herewe report theﬁrst proof-of-principle demonstration of the
Chau15 protocol. One highlight of our experiment is that its post-processing is based on practical
one-waymanner, while the original proposal inChau (2015 Phys. Rev.A 92 062324) relies on
complicated two-way post-processing, which is a great challenge in experiment. In addition, by
manipulating time-bin qudit andmeasurement with a variable delay interferometer, our realization is
extensible to qudit with high-dimensionality and conﬁrms the experimental feasibility of theChau15
protocol.
Introduction
Quantumkeydistribution (QKD) allows twodistant peersAlice andBob to share secret keybits throughaquantum
channelwhich is accessedbyamalicious eavesdropperEve [1, 2]. In a typicalQKDprotocol,Alice encodes random
classical bits intoquantumstates, and sends themtoBob,whomeasures the incomingquantumstates todecode
Alice’s classical bits. Thenby classical communications and randomsampling,Alice andBobcanobtain rawkeybits,
whose error rate canbe also estimated. Finally, by classical post-processing,Alice andBobcangenerate secret keybits.
Themost commonlyusedQKDprotocol is theBennett–Brassard 1984 (BB84)protocol [1] combinedwith thedecoy
statesmethod [3–5]. In thepast decade, tremendousprogresses in experimental decoy statesBB84havebeenachieved
[6–12]. Lately, several novelQKDprotocols havebeenproposed [13, 14–16]. Among theseprotocols,measurement-
device-independent-QKD [14] is immune to all detector-side-channel attacks andhavebeenproven tobe a feasible
QKDscheme [17–21]. And the round-Robin-differential-phase-shift (RRDPS)protocol features thatmonitoring
signal disturbance canbebypassed [16], thusbecomes anotherhot topic. In theRRDPSprotocol,Alicehas toprepare
trainsof pulses each consistingofLpulses. In the simple case that each train containsonly onephoton, the secret key
rateRof theRRDPSprotocol in theone-way classical communication setting equals 1−h2(ebit)−h2(1/(L−1)),
where ebit is thebit error rate of the rawkey [16]. Inotherwords, theRRDPSprotocol can toleratemuchhigherbit
error rate of the rawkey than theBB84protocolwhenL is sufﬁciently large.However, implementing theRRDPS
OPEN ACCESS
RECEIVED
18 September 2017
REVISED
31 January 2018
ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION
5 February 2018
PUBLISHED
7March 2018
Original content from this
workmay be used under
the terms of the Creative
CommonsAttribution 3.0
licence.
Any further distribution of
this workmustmaintain
attribution to the
author(s) and the title of
thework, journal citation
andDOI.
© 2018 IOPPublishing Ltd
protocol for largeLposts a great experimental challenge. In spite of the experimental difﬁculty, several experimental
demonstrationsofRRDPSprotocol havebeen reported [22–25].
Inspired by the RRDPS protocol, Chau recently proposed a novel QKDprotocol [13], called theChau15
protocol, which can tolerate very high error rate and has a simpler implementation than the RRDPS protocol. In
theChau15 protocol, for each trial Alice randomly picks two distinct numbers i, j from the set {1,K, L} and a
raw key bit kä {0 ≡+, 1≡−}, then prepares a quantum state y ñ = ñ  ñ∣ (∣ ∣ )i j 2ij according to the value
of k used. That is to say, Alice encodes each raw bit in the phase between the two time bins ñ∣i and ñ∣ j . Alice sends
y ñ∣ ijk to Bob, who then randomly picks two distinct numbersm, n in {1,K, L} andmeasures the incoming
photon along y ñ{∣ }mn . Bob records his raw key bit as 0 or 1 according to themeasurement result should the
detector clicks. Repeating above steps for sufﬁcient times, Alice and Bob announce their i, j andm, n for each trial
and only retain the raw key bits correspond to the cases that {i, j}={m, n} as their sifted key bits. In [13], Chau
proved that secret key bits can be generatedwhen the error rate of sifted key bits is very high. It is remarkable that
this scheme can tolerate up to 50% error rate provided that L=2p for some integer p 2.
It is instructive to realize theChau15protocol experimentally.One challenge is that onemust prepare and
measure certainhigh-dimensional quantumstates, namely, qudits, in theChau15protocol althoughpreparing and
measuring these special qudit states are less complicated that those for a general qudit state.Another challenge is that
the two-way classical communicationpost-processingmethod reported in [13] is both rather complicated andof low
yield.Here,weﬁrst present anew security proof of theChau15protocol basedon standardone-way communication
plus a simple secret key rate formula for any integer L 4 rather thanonly forL in the form2p. Then,we report a
proof-of-principle experimental demonstrationof theChau15protocol. In this experiment,we encode thequdit
basedonquantumsuperpositionof time-bin andmeasurement is performedwith thehelpof a variable delay
interferometer [24]. As far asweknow, this is theﬁrst experiment of theChau15protocol.
Security proof of theChau15 protocol for arbitrary L 4with one-way communication
Weﬁrst consider the case of an ideal single photon source and ideal detectors. Since the protocol is
permutationally symmetric, quantumdeFinetti theorem [26] implies that we only need to consider the security
under Eve’s general collective attack in the form
åñ ñ = ñ ñ
=
∣ ∣ ∣ ∣ ( )U i E c j E , 1
j
L
ij ijEve 00
0
where ñ∣Eij is the quantum state of Eve’s ancilla, ñ{∣ }Eij is a set of basis for Eve’s ancilla, dá ñ =∣E Eij il jl.Without
loss of generality, we assume c 0ij andå == c 1jN ij0 2 .
Denote the probability that Bob obtains y ñ∣ mn conditioned on the facts that Alice prepares her state as y ñ∣ ij
andBob tried to project the state along y ñ∣ mn by ( ∣ )p m n i j, , . In other words, ( ∣ )p m n i j, , is the chance that a
quantum state inHilbert space spanned by ñ ñ{∣ ∣ }i j, is transformed into a space spanned by ñ ñ{∣ ∣ }m n, .
In the supplementalmaterial is available online at stacks.iop.org/QST/3/025006/mmedia, we show that
Eve’s information on all sifted key bits is given by
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where = - - - -( ) ( ) ( )h x x x x xlog 1 log 12 2 2 is the binary entropy function. For easy use by experimental-
ists, we deﬁne themean counting rate = å < ( )( ∣ )Q p i j i j, ,i j L2 and
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Finally, the secret key rate per sifted key bit is given by
= - - - - ¢⎛⎝⎜
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where E is the bit error rate of the sifted key bit.
We remark that our asymptotic boundof IAEholds evenwhen (i, j) is biaseddistributed.As long as theprobability
forBob tomeasure anyoneof the (i, j)pairs is non-zero,we could then estimate ( ∣ )p m n i j, , to arbitrarily good
precision given a sufﬁciently longkey [27]. In fact, Bobuses biasedbasis selection inourproof-of-principle
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experiment.With thehelpof decoy states [3–5], this security proof canbe adapted in real-life implementationswith
weak coherent sources.And in the supplementarymaterial,we give an intuitive analysis to the case ofﬁnite key length
withdecoy states.
Demonstration of the superiority of theChau15 protocol over the BB84 protocol
Wegive an example to demonstrate the superiority of the Chau15 protocol over the BB84 protocol in terms of
the key rate. Suppose L=4 and consider the situation that Alice and Bob use ideal apparatus. The only source of
error is the quantum channel linkingAlice to Bob. Suppose further that this quantum channel  is four-
dimensional depolarizing. In otherwords, for any four-dimensional qudit, this channel keeps the state of the
qudit unchangedwith probability 1−p, andwith probability p, the qudit is replaced by the four-dimensional
completelymixed state. Thus, to each photon in theChau15 scheme using time-bin presentation, this is just a
depolarizing channel. But to the BB84 scheme using the same time-bin presentation, the situation ismore
complicated because the photon arrival timesmay change to the extend that sometimes Bobmay detectmultiple
photons in the timewindow assigned to the detection of a particular photon. And sometimes, he does not detect
a photon at all in that timewindow. In the supplementarymaterial, we show that by sending photons in time-bin
representation through this channel  , the key rates per sifted key bit send byAlice for theChau15 schemewith
L=4 and the BB84 protocols are given by
 = - - -⎜ ⎟
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respectively. Thismeans the supremumdepolarizing probability p belowwhich a secret key can be distilled
equals 0.2835 and 0.2051 for theChau15 andBB84 schemes, respectively. This shows the superiority of the
Chau15 schemewith L=4 over the BB84 protocol when p is in [0.2051, 0.2835].
Let us further analysis the situation.We show in the supplementarymaterial thatRChau15>RBB84 for all
0<p<0.2051 so that if wemeasure the key rate per sifted key bit, the Chau15 scheme is always better than the
BB84 protocol. Nevertheless,more realistic and fair comparisons should bemadewhich takes into account the
following factors: 1. Photons wasted due tomismatch in preparation andmeasurement bases; 2. Photons wasted
due tomultiple detector clicks or null detection; 3. Difference in the actual time during per photon pulse send.
In the supplementarymaterial, we show that in BB84, for those photons prepared andmeasured in the same
basis, the average rate of detection equals = - +( )T p p2 4 4BB84 2 . And note that in the time-bin
representation, the average time interval between successive photon pulse send byAlice in theChau15 scheme
for L=4 is twice as long as that of the BB84 if we assume that the arrival time corresponding to ñ∣i and + ñ∣i 1
are the same in both schemes. Taking these factors into account, the key rate per pulse to send one photon for the
BB84 scheme is h T R 2BB84 BB84 BB84 where h = 1 2BB84 and 1 is the probability that the preparation and
measurement bases agree for unbiased and extremely biased basis selection, respectively. (By extremely biased,
wemean a single basis is chosenwith probability arbitrarily close to 1.)The corresponding key rate for the
Chau15 schemewith L=4 equals ηChau15RChau15/4, where ηChau15=1/6 and 1 for unbiased and extremely
biased basis selection, respectively. Using the both two key rates per pulse, we conclude that for the four-
dimensional depolarizing channel, the Chau15 scheme has a higher key rate than the BB84 protocol provided
that p>0.1923 (p>0.1512) for the unbiased (extremely biased) basis selection. This further demonstrates the
superiority of theChau15 scheme over the BB84 protocol at least for the four-dimensional depolarizing channel
 provided that it is sufﬁciently noisy.
Experimental setup and results
Weperformed the experiment using the setup inﬁgure 1. Alice consists of a continuouswave (CW) laser at
1550.12 nm, three intensitymodulators (IMs) and two phasemodulators (PMs). IM1modulates theCW light
into a coherent pulse trainwith a temporal width of 96ps and a repetition rate of 1GHz. IM2 chops this pulse
train into packets of 5 time slots (5 ns), inwhich only two randompulses indexed by i and j (i, jä{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
and i<j) are allowed to pass. IM3 is employed to implement the decoy statesmethod [3–5], inwhich each
packet is randomlymodulated into signal, decoy1, or decoy2 states. PM1 encodes key bits bymodulating phase
- p p{ },2 2 on pulses for each packet, and PM2 adds random global phase on each packet. Finally, the variable
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attenuator (VA) attenuates the average photon numbers per packet to the single photon level. The output
quantum state prepared byAlice can be expressed as y ñ = ñ + ñf∣ (∣ ∣ )i je 2ij i , wherefä {0,π} is the phase
difference between the ith and jth pulses.
Bobmainly consists of a 1GHz, 1–4 bit variable-delay Faraday–Michelson interferometer (FMI) and a
double-channel single-photon detector (SPD). By setting the delay to r, the variable-delay FMImakes the ith
pulse interfere with the jth pulse if j=i+r. (Since no pulse will be picked to interfere with pulse iwhenever
i+r>5, Bob is in effect biased inmeasurement basis selection in our demonstrative experiment.)Two
channels of the SPD are connected to each of the output ports of the FMI, andwhich channel records a detection
event depends on the phase differencef. Through recording a click event in the interference slot, Bob fulﬁlls the
quantumprojection into y ñ∣ ij .
To realize the variable-delay interferometer, the same structure as in [24] is employed here. Each of the two
arms of this interferometer has twoﬁber delays, and the delay is chosen by a bidirectional NanoSpeed 1×2
optical switch (OS). The armwith the {0, 1} delays is named the short arm, and the armwith the {2, 4} delays is
named the long arm. The chosen delays of the long and short arms are denoted as Î { }x 2, 4 and Î { }y 0, 1
respectively. Then, the delay of the interferometer is r=x−y. In total, the variable-delay FMI can achieve fast
switch among 1–4 ns delay values. The piezoelectric transducer cylinder wrappedwith 2m ﬁberwas used to
obtain high precision of each delay, and also to compensate the phase shift of the interferometer. The insertion
loss (IL) of the interferometer (including the IL of the circulator) is about 2.0dB, and the values of each delay are
almost the same. This variable-delay interferometer is polarization insensitive owning to Faradaymirrors and
features an average extinction ratio of 23dB.
Photons from the variable-delayFMIweredetectedby thedouble-channel SPD, andﬁnally recordedby a time-
to-digital converter (TDC). Both channels of SPDare basedon InGaAs/InP avalanchephotodiodes and employ the
sine-waveﬁlteringmethod [28]. Theﬁrst channel features a detection efﬁciencyof 22.1% (down to20.8% if
including 2 3 ILofCIR), a dark count rate of 1.5×10−6 per gate, and after-pulseprobability of 0.8%.The second
channel features a detection efﬁciency of 20.9%, adark count rate of 1.1×10−6 per gate, and after-pulse probability
of 1.1%.TheTDCnotonly recorded signals but also setmeasurement timewindow.The valueof the timewindow
was set to 800psduring the experiment, and this setting reduced the average effective detection efﬁciencyof two
channels of the SPD to 20.4%,while the total dark countwas just a little less than2.6×10−6 per gate.
Basedon the experimental parameters listed above, the performanceofChau15 systemwas estimated and all
parameterswereoptimizedbymaximizing the secret key rate. Setting the intensity andprobability of one signal (μ)
and twodecoy states (ν1 andν2) close to the optimal ones,wemeasured themean yieldQ andQ′, and error rate of the
signal stateEμ at fourﬁber lengths: 50, 100, 130 and150 km.WhenAlice prepares laser pulse at time slots i and j, Bob
gets themeanyield = å < ( )( ∣ )Q p i j i j, ,i j 52 if he also gets interference output between these two time slots, and
Bobgets themean yield ¢ = å < < Î ( )( )( )( ∣ ){ }Q p m n i j, ,i j m n i j m n, : , , 52 32 if he obtains interference output between
time slots Î { }m n i j, , . The experimental results are listed in table 1.The last set of data over 50 km lengthﬁber is
obtained inhigh error rate case,whichmayhappen in theultrahigh speed case or harsher environment. In the
experiment,we intentionally distorted themodulating signal onPM1 to get error rate over 20%.
Secret keys can still be extracted at a transmission distance of 150 km,which is comparable with the
commonly used BB84 protocol. The secret key rate per packet is at 10−3 level over 50 km lengthﬁber, which is
lower than BB84 protocol. Note that in the absence of Eve, our experimental setupwith this 50 kmﬁber causes
mostly phase errorσz rather than spin-ﬂip errorσx to our qudit in time-bin representation. Actually, theσx error
rate is of order of 10−3, which is only about 10% that ofσz error rate.With such a smallσx error rate, wemay use
the biased-basismethod by preferentially select the preparation andmeasurement basis in theChau15 protocol
to be ñ  ñ(∣ ∣ ∣ )0 1 2 . In doing so, its secret key rate per packet is asymptotically equal to that of the biased
BB84 in time-bin representation for they have essentially the same setup in this limit. In addition, when the error
rate exceeds 20%,Chau15 protocol can still get secret key rate at 10−5 level over 50 km length ﬁber. Therefore,
Chau15 protocol can outperformBB84, especially in the high error rate case. And, Chau15 protocol can also
Figure 1.Experimental setup for theChau15 experiment. IM: intensitymodulator; PM: phasemodulator; VA: variable attenuator;
CIR: circulator; OS: optical switch; BS: beam splitter; SPD: single photon detector.
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outperformRRDPS. Themaximum transmission distance of the L=5RRDPS experiment system is less than
50 kmusing superconducting SPDs [23], while in our L=5Chau15 system, the transmission distance could
reach 150 kmwith InGaAs/InP SPD. The tolerant error rate of the L=65RRDPS experiment systemwith the
weak coherent source is less than 17% [24], while the value can exceed 20% inChau15 system even L=5. These
results veriﬁed that Chau15 protocol has good comprehensive performances onmaximum transmission
distance, secret key rate and tolerant error ratewith small L.
Nevertheless, the secret key rate per second of our proof-of-principle experimental realization is limited by
theOS,whose switching speed in the setup is about 100 ns. This limitation can be overcame by employing the
passive scheme based on 1×(L−1)BS (just like [23]), or slow basis choicemethod [29], or the development of
OS techniques in the near future. Themain drawback of using passive beam splitter is thatmore SPDs are
needed, whichmay be very impractical when L is large. And the total dark count rate is also increased in this case.
Another difﬁculty to overcome is toobtain relatively small yieldQ′, whichplays an important role to estimate
Eve’s information (see equation (3)). The smallerQ′Bobmeasures, themore key rateAlice andBob can share.
Table 1.Experimental results. The length ofﬁber (l), intensity (Int.) and probability (P) of one signal (μ) and two decoy states (ν1
and ν2), themean yield (Q andQ′), error rate of the signal state (Eμ), and the secret key rate per packet(Rinf for inﬁnite packet
number andRf for ﬁnite packet number). The last set of data over 50 kmﬁber is obtained in high error rate case. The total number
of packets sent fromAlice isN=3×1011, the failure probability is set to be 10−10, and parameters are optimized. The detailed
formulae for calculating key rate are given in supplementary ﬁle.
l (km)
Int. (ph/
packet) P(%) Q Q′ Eμ(%) Rinf Rf
50 μ 0.66 97.81 4.36×10−3 1.10×10−5 1.83 1.48×10−3 1.43×10−3
ν1 0.05 1.40 3.33×10
−4 3.23×10−6
ν2 0.0016 0.79 1.34×10
−5 2.61×10−6
100 μ 0.62 94.64 4.05×10−4 3.36×10−6 2.16 1.25×10−4 1.15×10−4
ν1 0.10 3.36 6.75×10
−5 2.71×10−6
ν2 0.0015 2.00 3.58×10
−6 2.60×10−6
130 μ 0.57 87.74 9.04×10−5 2.76×10−6 3.21 1.99×10−5 1.66×10−5
ν1 0.14 7.52 2.42×10
−5 2.63×10−6
ν2 0.0014 4.74 2.81×10
−6 2.60×10−6
150 μ 0.50 36.12 3.31×10−5 2.64×10−6 5.68 1.19×10−6 7.06×10−7
ν1 0.14 37.76 1.11×10
−5 2.61×10−6
ν2 0.0012 26.12 2.67×10
−6 2.60×10−6
50 μ 0.07 84.45 4.65×10−4 3.47×10−6 20.32 2.80×10−5 2.24×10−5
ν1 0.035 10.40 2.34×10
−4 3.03×10−6
ν2 0.0002 5.15 3.73×10
−6 2.60×10−6
Figure 2.Typical outputs of Alice detected byBob’s SPD (without interferometer). Here four kinds of typical outputs are given, 12
means i=1, j=2,L, 15means i=1, j=5.
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Under ideal conditions, i.e. the second intensitymodulator (IM2)hasperfect extinction ratio, the yieldQ′ shouldbe
equal to thedark count of the SPD.However, the experimental results show that the yieldQ′ is larger than thedark
count rate of the SPD, especially at short transmissiondistance. Tooffer an intuitive impression,wedeﬁne the count
ratioCm as the count at time slot i to the count at time slot ¹m i j, for the output packets fromAlice.Q′ canbe
evaluatedby themeanvalue ofCm. The sources contributing to relatively largeQ′mainly include the limited
extinction ratio of IM2, thedark count, after pulses and time jitter of the SPD.Therefore, Bob’s SPD (without
interferometer) is employed todirectlymeasure the outputs ofAlice. Fourkinds of typical outputswith i=1 (12,13,
14, and15) are shown inﬁgure2, the timewindowof TDC isnot set for thismeasurement. Theworst case
corresponds to the outputs of j=i+2.Taking13output ofAlice for example, the count ratioC2 is only 280.
Conclusion
In summary, we developed a security proof for theChau15 protocol with one-way post-processing, which
facilitates the secret key generation in real-life situation.We also illustrate the superiority of the Chau15 protocol
over the BB84 protocol for a certain depolarizing channel. In our experiment, the qubit-like qudits are prepared
bymanipulating time-bin of photon andmeasured by a variable delay interferometer. Our demonstration
exhibits theﬁne feasibility and high error-rate tolerance of the novel Chau15 protocol and sheds light onQKD
experiments with high-dimensionality.
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